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A well-known model of endogenous economic growth proposed by Barro
(1990) includes public services as a productive input for private producers. In
this model, the production with fixed government purchases is subject to dimin-
ishing returns to accumulated capital. But if government purchases rise along
with the capital stock, the production function specifies constant returns in gov-
ernment purchases and capital. This is the reason for the economy to be capable
of endogenous growth.
A crucial assumption of this model is made when describing the consumers
behavior. It is assumed that there is one representative infinitely-lived consumer
seeking to maximize her overall utility of consumption. The rate of growth, then,
depends on the discount factor describing how the representative consumer values
her future consumption. This leads to an issue of choosing the discount factor,
which somehow aggregates intertemporal preferences of all existing consumers.
To relax the restrictive and unrealistic assumption of a representative con-
sumer, we propose a model with heterogeneous agents differing in their discount
factors. A Ramsey-type model with consumer impatience heterogeneity was in-
troduced by Becker (1980), who showed that if an agent’s objective function over
an infinite horizon is represented by a stationary, additive, discounted-utility func-
tion with a constant pure rate of time preference, then the income distribution in
the steady state is determined by the lowest discount rate. The consumer with the
lowest rate of discount owns all the capital and earns the capital rent as well as
the wage income; all other consumers receive the wage income only.
There is a rich literature on models of economic growth with consumers hav-
ing different rates of impatience surveyed by Becker (2006). However, most exist-
ing papers on this topic ignore public sector. Exceptions include papers by Sarte
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(1997) and Sorger (2002), who study the impact of a progressive income tax on
the long-run distribution of wealth.
In Becker’s model, the long-run capital intensity is determined by the discount
factor of the most patient consumer. It is reasonable to expect that in an endoge-
nous growth model the long-run rate of growth is determined by the discount
factor of the most patient consumer. This would be true in the Barro model with
consumers having different discount factors if tax rates were given exogenously.
However the assumption of an exogenously given tax rate embedded into the
Barro model, does not seem reasonable. From a positive point of view, taxes
should be considered as endogenous. When we consider a model with heteroge-
neous consumers it is more sensible to assume that when determining tax rates
any government is likely to be responsive to the wishes of a majority of popula-
tion. To capture this responsiveness we adopt a politico-economic approach and
assume that tax rates are determined endogenously by a voting procedure, which
serves as a metaphor for real political process. Even in a dictatorship, a majority
of population influences economic policy decisions.
Our model is akin to a model proposed by Alesina and Rodrik (1994), who
study Barro’s model under the assumption that public investment is financed by
a tax on capital income and heterogeneous consumers vote on the tax rate, but
our focus is different. In that model, as in most other politico-economic models
of economic growth with infinitely lived consumers , individuals have identical
discount factors, but differ in income and/or wealth (see Bassetto and Benhabib
(2006); Grossmann (2003); Corbae and Kuruscu (2009); Fiaschi (1999); Azzi-
monti et al. (2008); Krusell and Rios-Rull (1999) among others).
In our model, consumers are differentiated by their fixed rates of time pref-
erence. We focus on the effects of consumer heterogeneity in time preference on
policy choices and on the long-run rate of economic growth. In particular, we
compare the long-run rates of growth under flat-rate and lump sum taxation.
Another distinction between our approach to modeling policy decisions and
that of Alesina and Rodrik (1994) is that they assume the applicability of the me-
dian voter theorem to steady-state equilibria from the outset. They justify this
assumption by the fact that they proceed from steady-state equilibria. By con-
trast, we treat the problem as truly dynamic and following Borissov et al. (2010)
first propose a notion of voting equilibrium path (which is not necessarily bal-
anced) and then prove two versions of the median voter theorem for steady-state
equilibria.
The application of the median voter theorem to dynamic models of the po-
litical economy requires a suitable analytical simplification of the political and
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economic environment. Models of this kind are much harder to analyze than
their static counterparts and than the usual intertemporal models without politi-
cal components. The performance of majoritarian institutions in dynamic settings
has attracted growing interest and attention (see e.g. Baron (1996); Krusell et al.
(1997); Cooley and Soares (1999); Rangel (2003); Bernheim and Slavov (2009)).
However, the development of the theory is still in its infancy and the consensus
on how to model dynamic majoritarian voting has not been achieved.
Without going into detail, notice that our approach to voting is different from
approaches accepted in the above-mentioned papers. Our definition of voting
equilibrium can be considered as a dynamic version of the Bowen equilibrium
(Bowen, 1943; Bergstrom, 1979). It is closely related to Kramer-Shepsle’s equi-
librium (Kramer, 1972; Shepsle, 1979).
In this paper, we describe the structure of steady-state voting equilibria in the
cases of flat-rate taxation and lump-sum taxation and compare them and derive
explicit formulas the long-run rates of growth. In particular, we show that in both
cases the long-run equilibrium rate of growth is increasing in the discount factors
of the most patient and the median consumers. In the case of flat-rate income
taxation, the long-run equilibrium rate of growth is completely determined by
these discount factors. In the case of lump-sum taxation, if the median discount
factor is equal to the highest one, the long-run equilibrium rate of growth also is
increasing in the relative wealth of the median voter.
We also compare the equilibrium rates of growth in the cases of flat-rate and
lump sum taxation and show that if the median voter discount factor is sufficiently
low, the rate of growth in the case of flat-rate income taxation is higher than that
in the case of lump sum taxation. This result is in some contrast with the conven-
tional wisdom that lump sum taxes are always preferable to distorting taxes.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 1, we introduce our main as-
sumptions. In section 2, we consider the case of flat-rate income taxes and sec-
tion 3 analyzes the case of lump sum taxes. In section 4, we compare the equilib-
rium rates of growth in these two cases. Conclusion follows in section 5.
1. The model
1.1. Consumers
There is an odd number L of consumers. We assume that all consumers live for an
infinite period of time and are identical in all respect except their discount factors.
Each time each consumer supply one unit of labor force in the labor market. Thus
the total labor supply at each time is L.
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The utility function of consumer i is of the form
∑∞
t=0 β
t
i u(Ci,t), where βi is
the discount function of this consumer and Ci,t is his consumption at time t. We
assume that
u(C) = ln C.
We assume that the consumers are sorted in the ascending order of their dis-
count factors:
0 < β1 ≤ β2 ≤ · · · ≤ βL ≡ βmax < 1.
By I we denote the set of agents with the highest discount factor:
I = {i = 1, . . . , L | βi = βL}.
We consider two types of taxes : a flat-rate income tax and a lump sum tax.
In the case of flat-rate income taxation the budget constraints of consumer i is
of the following form
Ci,t + S i,t ≤ (1 − θt) [(1 + rt) S i,t−1 + Wt] , S i,t ≥ 0, t = 0, 1, . . . ,
Here rt and Wt are interest and wage rates at time t, S i,t are the savings of consumer
i at time t and θt (0 ≤ θt ≤ 1), t = 0, 1, . . . , are the tax rates. Consumers are
prohibited to borrow against their future wage earnings. Therefore, their savings
must be non-negative.
In the case of lump sum taxation at given tax rates τt ≥ 0, t = 0, 1, . . . , the
budget constraint of consumer i takes the form
Ci,t + S i,t ≤ (1 + rt) S i,t−1 + Wt − τt, S i,t ≥ 0, t = 0, 1, . . .
1.2. Production
We assume that output at each time t, Yt, is given by
Yt = φ(gt)F(Kt, L), (1)
where Kt is the capital stock and gt is the per capita quantity of public good at time
t. Capital fully depreciates during one time period. We assume that the production
function is Cobb-Douglas:
F(K, L) = KαL1−α, 0 < α < 1,
and that
φ(g) = g1−α.
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Thus,
Yt = g1−αt K
α
t L
1−α.
Hence the production function given by (1) is of the constant returns to scale in
Kt and L for any given quantity of per capita public good gt. At the same time,
it is of constant return to scale in the stock of capital, Kt, and the quantity of per
capita public good, gt.
Per capita output yt = Yt/L can be written as follows
yt = φ(gt) f (kt) = g1−αt k
α
t ,
where kt = Kt/L and f (kt) = kαt .
2. Endogenous growth with flat-rate income tax
In this section we assume that the government collects flat-rate income taxes. Fur-
ther, in section 3, we will give necessary definitions and formulate corresponding
theorems for the case of lump sum taxation.
2.1. Equilibrium paths and steady-state equilibria
Let the sequence Θ = (θt)∞t=0 of tax rates and an initial state specified by gˆ0 > 0
and a tuple
{
Sˆ i,−1
}
i=1,...,L
such that
Sˆ i,−1 ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , L,
L∑
i=1
Sˆ i,−1 > 0,
be given. We define an equilibrium path starting from this initial state as a se-
quence {
k∗t , r
∗
t ,W
∗
t , g
∗
t ,
(
C∗i,t, S
∗
i,t
)
i=1,...,L
}
t=0,1,...
such that g∗0 = gˆ0 and
1) for each i = 1, . . . , L, the sequence
(
C∗i,t, S
∗
i,t
)
t=0,1,...
is a solution to the fol-
lowing problem:
max
∞∑
t=0
βtiu(Ci,t), (2)
Ci,t + S i,t ≤ (1 − θt) [(1 + r∗t ) S i,t−1 + W∗t ] , t = 0, 1, . . . ,
S i,t ≥ 0, t = 0, 1, . . .
where S i,−1 = Sˆ i,−1.
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2) total consumer savings are equal to gross investment:
Lk∗t =
L∑
i=1
S ∗i,t−1, t = 0, 1, . . . ,
3) capital is paid its marginal product:
1 + r∗t = φ(g
∗
t ) f
′(k∗t ), t = 0, 1, . . . ,
4) labor is paid its marginal product:
W∗t = φ(g
∗
t )( f (k
∗
t ) − f ′(k∗t )k∗t ), t = 0, 1, . . . ,
5) at each time public sector is financed via taxes collected in the previous
period:
g∗t+1 = θtφ(g
∗
t ) f (k
∗
t ), t = 0, 1, . . .
We shall make our emphasis on steady-state equilibria. They are defined as
follows.
Let the tax rate be constant over time: θt = θ, t = 0, 1, . . . . A tuple{
γ∗, k∗, r∗,W∗, g∗,
(
C∗i , S
∗
i
)
i=1,...,L
}
is called a steady-state equilibrium if the sequence{
k∗t , r
∗
t ,W
∗
t , g
∗
t ,
(
C∗i,t, S
∗
i,t
)
i=1,...,L
}
t=0,1,...
given for t = 0, 1, . . . and i = 1, . . . , L by
k∗t = (1 + γ
∗)tk∗, 1 + r∗t = 1 + r
∗, W∗t = (1 + γ
∗)tW∗,
g∗t = (1 + γ
∗)tg∗, C∗i,t = (1 + γ
∗)tC∗i , S
∗
i,t = (1 + γ
∗)tS ∗i ,
is an equilibrium path.
To describe steady-state equilibria we need the following definition.
Suppose that for some r, W, γ, θ,
rt = r, Wt = (1 + γ)tW, θt = θ, t = 0, 1, . . .
We call a couple
(
C∗i , S
∗
i
)
a balanced optimum of consumer i if the sequence
(C∗i,t, S
∗
i,t)
∞
t=0 given by
C∗i,t = (1 + γ)
t C∗i , S
∗
i,t = (1 + γ)
t S ∗i , t = 0, 1, . . . ,
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is a solution to problem (2) at Sˆ i,−1 = (1 + γ)−1 S ∗i .
It is clear that for any constant over time tax rate, θ, a tuple{
γ∗, k∗, r∗,W∗, g∗,
(
C∗i , S
∗
i
)
i=1,...,L
}
is a steady-state equilibrium if and only if
1 + r∗ = φ(g∗) f ′(k∗), (3)
W∗ = φ(g∗)[ f (k∗) − f ′(k∗)k∗], (4)
(1 + γ∗) k∗L =
L∑
i=1
S ∗i , (5)
(1 + γ∗) g∗ = θφ(g∗) f (k∗), (6)
and, for each i = 1, . . . , L, the couple
(
C∗i , S
∗
i
)
is a balanced optimum of consumer
i at r = r∗ and W = W∗.
To describe properties of steady-state equilibria we formulate the following
simple lemma.
Lemma 1. Given r, W, γ and θ,
1) a balanced optimum of consumer i exists if and only if
(1 − θ)βi ≤ 1 + γ1 + r ;
2) if (1 − θ)βi = (1 + γ) / (1 + r), then any couple
(
C∗i , S
∗
i
)
such that
C∗i + S
∗
i = (1 − θ)
(
1 + r
1 + γ
S ∗i + W
)
, C∗i ≥ 0, S ∗i ≥ 0,
is a balanced optimum of consumer i;
3) if (1 − θ)βi < (1 + γ) / (1 + r), then there is a unique balanced optimum of
consumer i,
(
C∗i , S
∗
i
)
; it is given by C∗i = (1 − θ) W, S ∗i = 0.
Now we can formulate an important proposition describing the structure of
steady-state equilibria in the case of flat-rate income taxation. It follows from
Lemma 1.
Proposition 1. Let a constant over time tax rate, θ, be given. A tuple{
γ∗, k∗, r∗,W∗, g∗,
(
C∗i , S
∗
i
)
i=1,...,L
}
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is a steady-state equilibrium if and only if it satisfies conditions (3)–(6) and
(1 − θ)βmax = 1 + γ
∗
1 + r∗
, (7)
C∗i + S
∗
i = (1 − θ)
(
1 + r∗
1 + γ∗
S ∗i + W
∗
)
, C∗i ≥ 0, S ∗i ≥ 0, i ∈ I, (8)
S ∗i = 0, C
∗
i = (1 − θ)W∗, i < I. (9)
To prove this proposition it is sufficient to repeat a well-known argument by
Becker (1980, 2006). The proposition says that only the most patient consumers
make positive savings and own all the capital.
2.2. Voting equilibria
Consider an equilibrium path{
k∗t , r
∗
t ,W
∗
t , g
∗
t ,
(
C∗i,t, S
∗
i,t
)
i=1,...,L
}
t=0,1,...
and ask each consumer i, weather she prefers to increase or decrease the tax rate
at time t. We assume that when answering this question, consumers take into
account the fact that the taxes collected at time t are equal to the supply of public
goods at time t + 1 and that the latter impacts the total factor productivity and
hence marginal products of capital and labor.
To be more precise, first note that for each i, (C∗i,t, S
∗
i,t)t=0,1,... is a solution to
the following problem:
max
∞∑
t=0
βtiu(Ci,t), (10)
Ci,t + S i,t ≤ (1 − θt)[φ(g∗t ) f ′(k∗t )S i,t−1 + φ(g∗t )( f (k∗t ) − f ′(k∗t )k∗t )], (11)
S i,t ≥ 0, t = 0, 1, . . . ,
where S i,−1 = Sˆ i,−1. Recall that
g∗0 = gˆ0, g
∗
t = θt−1φ(g
∗
t−1) f (k
∗
t−1), t = 0, 1, . . . (12)
Let us consider the value of (10), Vi, as a function of Θ = (θt)∞t=0. We assume
that the attitude of consumer i to a possible change in θt is determined by the sign
of the derivative ∂Vi/∂θt, if it exists. If ∂Vi/∂θt > 0, consumer i is in favor of
increasing θt. If ∂Vi/∂θt < 0, consumer i is in favor of decreasing θt.
When calculating the derivative ∂Vi/∂θt, consumer i treats k∗t , t = 0, 1, . . . , as
independent of θt. Thus she takes account of the effect of the supply of public
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goods and hence of the tax choice on total factor productivity but she is igno-
rant of the effect of the tax choice on the capital stocks in intertemporal general
equilibrium.
Definition 1. We call a sequence{
θ∗t , k
∗
t , r
∗
t ,W
∗
t , g
∗
t ,
(
C∗i,t, S
∗
i,t
)
i=1,...,L
}
t=0,1,...
a voting equilibrium path if
{
k∗t , r∗t ,W∗t , g∗t ,
(
C∗i,t, S
∗
i,t
)
i=1,...,L
}
t=0,1,...
is an equilib-
rium path at Θ = (θ∗t )∞t=0 and for each t, the number of consumers who are in
favor of increasing θt and the number of those who are in favor of decreasing θt
is less than L/2.
Here we certainly do not mean that the individuals votes for any change in a
tax rate. This consideration merely reflects the idea that the government responds
somehow to the wishes of a majority when choosing tax rates.
We will not discuss the existence and properties of voting equilibria in general
form, but we will describe voting steady-state equilibria.
Definition 2. If the sequence
{
θ∗t , k∗t , r∗t ,W∗t , g∗t ,
(
C∗i,t, S
∗
i,t
)
i=1,...,L
}
t=0,1,...
given by
θ∗t = θ
∗, k∗t = k
∗ (1 + γ∗)t , g∗t = g
∗ (1 + γ∗)t ,
C∗i,t = C
∗
i (1 + γ
∗)t , S ∗i,t = S
∗
i (1 + γ
∗)t ,
i = 1, . . . , L, t = 0, 1, . . .
forms a voting equilibrium path, then the tuple{
θ∗, γ∗, k∗, r∗,W∗, g∗,
(
C∗i , S
∗
i
)
i=1,...,L
}
is called a voting steady-state equilibrium.
The following theorem describes voting steady-state equilibria in the case of
flat-rate income taxation. It reads that an important role in formating steady-state
equilibria is played by the median consumer m = (L + 1)/2.
Theorem 1. A tuple {
θ∗, γ∗, k∗, r∗,W∗, g∗,
(
C∗i , S
∗
i
)
i=1,...,L
}
represents a voting steady-state equilibrium, if and only if it satisfies conditions
(3)–(9) at θ = θ∗ and
1 + γ∗ = (1 − θ∗)βmφ′(g∗) f (k∗). (13)
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Proof. Let the tuple {
γ∗, k∗, r∗,W∗, g∗,
(
C∗i , S
∗
i
)
i=1,...,L
}
be a steady-state equilibrium constructed at θ = θ∗ and{
k∗t , r
∗
t ,W
∗
t , g
∗
t ,
(
C∗i,t, S
∗
i,t
)
i=1,...,L
}
t=0,1,...
be an equilibrium path corresponding to this steady-state equilibrium.
By the envelope theorem, taking into account (12), for all i = 1, . . . , L and all
t = 0, 1, . . . , we have
∂Vi
∂θt
= −βtiu′
(
C∗i,t
) [(
1 + r∗t
)
S ∗i,t−1 + W
∗
t
]
+ βt+1i u
′ (C∗i,t+1) (1 − θ∗) [φ′ (g∗t+1) f ′ (k∗t+1) S ∗i,t
+ φ′
(
g∗t+1
) (
f
(
k∗t+1
)
− f ′
(
k∗t+1
)
k∗t
)]
φ
(
g∗t
)
f
(
k∗t
)
= −βtiu′
(
C∗i,t
) [
(1 + r∗) S ∗i,t−1 + W
∗
t
]
+ βt+1i u
′ (C∗i,t+1) (1 − θ∗) φ′
(
g∗t+1
)
φ
(
g∗t+1
)
×
f
(
k∗t+1
)
f
(
k∗t+1
) [(1 + r∗) S ∗i,t + W∗t+1] φ (g∗t ) f (k∗t ) .
Also we have
g∗t+1 = (1 + γ
∗) g∗t , k
∗
t+1 = (1 + γ
∗) k∗t ,
C∗i,t+1 = (1 + γ
∗) C∗i,t, u
′ (C∗i,t+1) = u′
(
C∗i,t
)
1 + γ∗
,[
(1 + r∗) S ∗i,t + W
∗
t+1
]
= (1 + γ∗)
[
(1 + r∗) S ∗i,t−1 + W
∗
t
]
,
φ
(
g∗t+1
)
f
(
k∗t+1
)
= (1 + γ∗) φ
(
g∗t
)
f
(
k∗t
)
,
φ′
(
g∗t+1
)
f
(
k∗t+1
)
= φ′ (g∗) f (k∗) .
Therefore,
∂Vi
∂θt
= −βtiu′
(
C∗i,t
) [
(1 + r∗) S ∗i,t−1 + W
∗
t
]
×
[
βi (1 − θ∗)
1 + γ∗
φ′(g∗t+1) f (k
∗
t+1) − 1
]
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and hence
sign
∂Vi
∂θt
= sign
{
βi (1 − θ∗)
1 + γ∗
φ′
(
g∗t+1
)
f
(
k∗t+1
)
− 1
}
= sign
{
βi (1 − θ∗)
1 + γ∗
φ′ (g∗) f (k∗) − 1
}
.
To complete the proof it is sufficient to notice that
∂Vi
∂θt
T 0 ⇔ βi(1 − θ∗)φ′(g∗) f (k∗) T 1 + γ∗.

This theorem allows us to calculate the equilibrium growth and tax rates in
the case of flat-rate income taxation. Recalling that the production function is
Cobb-Douglas,
φ(gt) = g1−αt , f (kt) = k
α
t ,
one obtains from (6)
1 + γ∗ = θ∗
φ (g∗) f (k∗)
g∗
= θ∗
(
k∗
g∗
)α
.
At the same time (3) and (7) give
1 + γ∗ = αβmax(1 − θ∗)
(
g∗
k∗
)1−α
,
and (13) yields
1 + γ∗ = (1 − α)βm(1 − θ∗)
(
k∗
g∗
)α
.
It follows that
θ∗ =
(1 − α)βm
1 + (1 − α)βm ,
k∗
g∗
=
αβmax
(1 − α)βm ,
and hence
1 + γ∗ =
(αβmax)α
[
(1 − α)βm]1−α
1 + (1 − α)βm . (14)
Thus, the equilibrium tax rate grows as the patience of the median consumer
represented by βm increases. As for the long-run rate of growth, it increases with
the discount factors of the median and the most patient consumers.
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3. Endogenous growth under lump sum taxation
In this section we consider the case of lump sum taxation. In this case the def-
inition of equilibrium path is slightly different from that in the case of flat-rate
income taxation.
3.1. Equilibrium paths and steady-state equilibria
Suppose that tax rates τt, t = 0, 1, . . . and an initial state gˆ0, {Sˆ i,−1}i=1,...,L are given.
We define an equilibrium path starting from this initial state as a sequence{
k?t , r
?
t ,W
?
t , g
?
t ,
(
C?i,t, S
?
i,t
)
i=1,...,L
}
t=0,1,...
such that
1) 1 + r?t = φ(g
?
t ) f
′ (k?t );
2) W?t = φ(g
?
t )
[
f
(
k?t
) − k?t f ′ (k?t )];
3) for each i = 1, . . . , L, the sequence
(
C?i,t, S
?
i,t
)
t=0,1,...
is a solution to the fol-
lowing problem:
max
∞∑
t=0
β ti u(Ci,t), (15)
Ci,t + S i,t ≤
(
1 + r?t
)
S i,t−1 + W?t − τt, t = 0, 1, . . . ,
S i,t ≥ 0, t = 0, 1, . . . ,
where S i,−1 = Sˆ i,−1;
4) Lk?t =
∑L
i=1 S
?
i,t−1, t = 0, 1, . . . ;
5) g?t+1 = τt, t = 0, 1, . . . .
When defining equilibrium paths we take the tax rates τt, t = 0, 1, . . . , as
given and assume that the taxes are not too burdensome: τt < W?t , t = 0, 1, . . . .
To define a steady-state equilibrium it is convenient to take as given another mag-
nitude because on a balanced equilibrium path τt must grow at the same rate as
the economy as a whole. But this growth rate is endogenously determined and is
not known a priori.
For any balanced equilibrium path{
k?t , r
?
t ,W
?
t , g
?
t ,
(
C?i,t, S
?
i,t
)
i=1,...,L
}
t=0,1,...
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the proportion τt/
[
φ (gt) f (kt)
]
is constant over time. To define steady-state equi-
libria it is sufficient to take this proportion as given. Denote it by µ and notice that
τ < W?t is equivalent to µ < 1 − α.
Let µ < 1 − α be given. We define a steady-state equilibrium as a tuple{
γ?, k?, r?,W?, g?,
(
C?i , S
?
i
)
i=1,...,L
}
,
such that the sequence
{
k?t , r
?
t ,W
?
t , g
?
t ,
(
C?i,t, S
?
i,t
)
i=1,...,L
}
t=0,1,...
given for t = 0, 1, . . .
and i = 1, . . . , L by
k?t = (1 + γ
?)tk?, 1 + r?t = 1 + r
?, W?t = (1 + γ
?)tW?
g?t = (1 + γ
?)tg?, C?i,t = (1 + γ
?)tC?i , S
?
i,t = (1 + γ
?)tS ?i ,
is an equilibrium path at (τt)∞t=0 determined by
τt = µφ(g?t ) f (k
?
t ), t = 0, 1, . . . .
The definition of a balanced consumer optimum can be given as follows.
For given r, W, γ, τ < W, we call a couple (C?i , S
?
i ) a balanced consumer
optimum if the sequence (C?i,t, S
?
i,t)
∞
t=0 given by
C?i,t = C
?
i (1 + γ)
t , S ?i,t = S
?
i (1 + γ)
t , t = 0, 1, . . . ,
is a solution to the following problem:
max
∞∑
t=0
βtiu(Ci,t),
Ci,t + S i,t ≤ (1 + rt)S i,t−1 + (1 + γ)tW − (1 + γ)tτ, t = 0, 1, . . . ,
S i,t ≥ 0, t = 0, 1, . . . ,
at S i,−1 = (1 + γ)−1S ?i .
It is evident that, for a given µ < 1 − α, a tuple{
γ?, k?, r?,W?, g?,
(
C?i , S
?
i
)
i=1,...,L
}
is a steady-state equilibrium, if and only if it satisfies conditions (3)-(5),(
1 + γ?
)
g? = µφ(g?) f (k?), (16)
and, for all i = 1, . . . , L, the couple
(
C?i , S
?
i
)
is a balanced consumer optimum at
r = r?, W = W?, γ = γ?, τ = µφ(g?) f (k?).
The following lemma is useful for describing the structure of steady-state
equilibria.
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Lemma 2 (cf. Lemma 1). Let r, W, γ, τ < W be given.
1) A balanced consumer optimum for consumer i exists, if, and only if
βi ≤ 1 + γ1 + r .
2) If βi = (1 + γ)/(1 + r), then any couple
(
C?i , S
?
i
)
, such that
C?i + S
?
i =
1 + r
1 + γ
S ?i + W − τ,
is a balanced consumer optimum.
3) If βi < (1 + γ)/(1 + r), then the only balanced consumer optimum is the
couple
(
C?i , S
?
i
)
given by C?i = W − τ, S ?i = 0.
Proposition 2 (cf. Proposition 1). A tuple{
γ?, k?, r?,W?, g?,
(
C?i , S
?
i
)
i=1,...,L
}
forms a steady-state equilibrium, if and only if it satisfies conditions (3)-(5), (16),
and for τ = µφ(g?) f (k?), the following conditions hold:
1 + γ? = βmax(1 + r?), (17)
C?i + S
?
i =
1 + r?
1 + γ?
S ?i + W
? − τ, S i ≥ 0, i ∈ I, (18)
S ?i = 0, C
?
i = W
? − τ, i < I. (19)
3.2. Voting equilibria
Consider the value of problem (15) as a function of tax rates, T = (τt)∞t=0, and
denote this value as Vi(T).
As in the case of flat-rate taxes, to define voting equilibrium paths in case of
lump sum taxation we assume that when voting, consumer i looks at the value of
the derivative ∂Vi/∂τt, if one exists. If ∂Vi/∂τt > 0, this consumer is in favor of
increasing of τt. If ∂Vi/∂τt < 0, the consumer is in favor of decreasing of τt. If
∂Vi/∂τt = 0, this consumer is indifferent in this respect.
We call a sequence{
τ?t , k
?
t , r
?
t ,W
?
t , g
?
t ,
(
C?i,t, S
?
i,t
)
i=1,...,L
}
t=0,1,...
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a voting equilibrium path if
{
k?t , r
?
t ,W
?
t , g
?
t ,
(
C?i,t, S
?
i,t
)
i=1,...,L
}
t=0,1,...
is an equilib-
rium path at T? = (τ?t )
∞
t=0, τ
?
t < W
?
t , t = 0, 1, . . . , and for each t, the number of
consumers who are in favor of increasing τt and the number of those who are in
favor of decreasing τt is less than L/2.
We will not discuss the existence and properties of voting equilibrium paths,
but will describe voting steady-state equilibria.
A tuple {
µ?, k?, r?,W?, g?, γ?,
(
C?i , S
?
i
)
i=1,...,L
}
is called a voting steady-state equilibrium if the tuple{
τ?t , k
?
t , r
?
t ,W
?
t , g
?
t ,
(
C?i,t, S
?
i,t
)
i=1,...,L
}
t=0,1,...
given for i = 1, . . . , L and t = 0, 1, . . . by
k?t = k
?
(
1 + γ?
)t
, g?t = g
?
(
1 + γ?
)t
, τ?t = µ
?φ(g?t ) f (k
?
t ),
C?i,t = C
?
i
(
1 + γ?
)t
, S ?i,t = S
?
i
(
1 + γ?
)t
,
forms a voting equilibrium path starting from the initial state gˆ0,{
Sˆ i,−1
}
i=1,...,L
given by
gˆ0 = g?, Sˆ i,−1 = (1 + γ?)−1S ?i , i = 1, . . . , L.
Theorem 2 (cf. Theorem 1). In the case of lump sum taxation, a tuple{
µ?, k?, r?,W?, g?, γ?,
(
C?i , S
?
i
)
i=1,...,L
}
is a voting steady-state equilibrium, if and only if, for τ? = µ?φ(g?) f (k?), it
satisfies conditions (3)-(5), (16)-(19), µ? < 1 − α and
1 + γ? = βmφ′(g?)
[
f ′(k?)
1 + γ?
S ?m + f (k
?) − k? f ′(k?)
]
, (20)
where index m denotes the consumer being the median among consumers sorted
ascending in their equilibrium savings S ?i and their discount factors βi.
Prior to proving this theorem, notice that ascending sorting in S ?i does not
contradict to ascending sorting in βi. Indeed, in any steady-state equilibrium only
the most patient consumers i ∈ I can make positive savings. They have the same
discount factors βi = βmax and they are sorted ascending in their savings S ?i in the
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set of most patient consumers. Less patient consumers i < I have zero equilibrium
savings S ?i = 0 and they are sorted ascending in their discount factors βi in the set
of less patient consumers.
Proof. Let a tuple {
µ?, k?, r?,W?, g?, γ?,
(
C?i , S
?
i
)
i=1,...,L
}
be a steady-state voting equilibrium at µ = µ? and{
k?t , r
?
t ,W
?
t , g
?
t ,
(
C?i,t, S
?
i,t
)
i=1,...,L
}
t=0,1,...
be a corresponding equilibrium path.
For each i = 1, . . . , L, the sequence (C?i,t, S
?
i,t)
∞
t=0 is a solution to the following
problem
max
∞∑
t=0
βtiu(Ci,t),
Ci,t + S i,t ≤ φ(g?t ) f ′(k?t )S i,t−1 + φ(g?t )[ f (k?t ) − f ′(k?t )k?t ] − τt,
S i,t ≥ 0, t = 0, 1, . . . ,
where S i,−1 = (1 + γ?)−1S ?i , gˆ0 = g
?, τt = (1 + γ?)tµ?φ(g?0 ) f (k
?
0 ), g
?
t+1 = τt,
t = 0, 1, . . .
By the envelope theorem, for all i = 1, . . . , L and all t = 0, 1, . . . , we have
∂Vi
∂τt
= −βtiu′
(
C?i,t
)
+ βt+1i u
′ (C?i,t+1)
× φ′
(
g?t+1
) [
f ′
(
k?t+1
)
S ?i,t + f (k
?
t+1) − f ′
(
k?t+1
)
k?t
]
.
Also we have
g?t = (1 + γ
?)tg?, k?t = (1 + γ
?)tk?,
C?i,t = (1 + γ
?)tC?i , S
?
i,t = (1 + γ
?)tS ?i ,
u′
(
C?i,t+1
)
=
u′(C?i,t)
1 + γ?
,
φ′(g?t+1) f (k
?
t+1) = φ(g
?) f (k?),
f (k?t+1) − f ′(k?t+1)k?t+1
f (k?t+1)
= 1 − α = f (k
?) − f ′(k?)k?
f (k?)
,
f ′(k?t+1)
f (k?t+1)
=
α
k?t+1
=
α
(1 + γ?)t+1k?
=
f ′(k?)
(1 + γ?)t+1 f (k?)
.
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Therefore,
∂Vi
∂τt
= βtiu
′ (C?i,t)
 βi1 + γ? φ
′ (g?t+1) f (k?t+1)
f
(
k?t+1
)
×
[
f ′
(
k?t+1
)
S ?i,t + f
(
k?t+1
)
− f ′
(
k?t+1
)
k?t+1
]
− 1
 = βtiu′ (C?i,t)
×
{
βi
1 + γ?
φ′
(
g?
) [ f ′ (k?)
1 + γ?
S ?i + f
(
k?
)
− f ′
(
k?
)
k?
]
− 1
}
and hence
sign
∂Vi
∂τt
= sign
{
βi
1 + γ?
φ′
(
g?
) [ f ′ (k?)
1 + γ?
S ?i + f
(
k?
)
− f ′
(
k?
)
k?
]
− 1
}
.
To complete the proof it is sufficient to notice that
∂Vi
∂τt
T 0 ⇔ βiφ′(g?)
[
f ′
(
k?
)
1 + γ?
S ?i + f
(
k?
)
− f ′
(
k?
)
k?
]
T 1 + γ?.
This completes the proof of the theorem. 
It should be noticed that if βm < βmax, then the savings of the median voter are
zero and hence (20) takes the form
1 + γ? = βmφ′
(
g?
) [
f
(
k?
)
− k? f ′
(
k?
)]
. (21)
If βm = βmax, then the median voter can have positive savings in a steady-state
equilibrium, and the set of possible equilibria is a continuum. This set can be
parameterized by the relative wealth of the median voter, defined as
ξ?m =
f ′(k?t )S ?m,t−1 + f (k
?
t ) − k?t f ′(k?t )
f (k?t )
= 1 −
(
S ?m
1 + γ?
− k?
)
f ′(k?)
f (k?)
, (22)
and (20) can be rewritten as
1 + γ? = βmξ?mφ
′(g?) f (k?). (23)
(if βm < βmax it reduces to (21)).
Following the politico-economic literature about income inequality (see, e.g.,
Meltzer and Richard (1981)), an income distribution is called more equal, the
higher the median income is relative to the mean (this is only reasonable in the
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case where the median income does not exceed the mean, which is considered as
a typical situation). For our model this implies that if βm = βmax, lower inequality
has a positive effect on the equilibrium rate of growth.
Recalling that the production function is Cobb-Douglas,
φ(gt) = g1−αt , f (kt) = k
α
t ,
by (17) and (23), we have
1 + γ? = αβmax
(
g?
k?
)1−α
,
1 + γ? = (1 − α)βmξm
(
k?
g?
)α
.
Therefore,
µ? = (1 − α) βmξ?m,
k?
g?
=
αβmax
(1 − α)βmξ?m ,
and hence
1 + γ? = (αβmax)α
[
(1 − α)βmξ?m
]1−α
. (24)
Thus, as in the case of flat-rate income taxation, the long-run rate growth
increases monotonically with the discount factor of the median consumer, βm, and
the discount factor of the most patient consumer, βmax, but here it also depends on
the median voter relative wealth, ξ?m.
4. Lump-sum and flat-rate taxes compared
Let a tuple {
γ?, k?, r?,W?, g?,
(
C?i , S
?
i
)
i=1,...,L
}
be a steady-state equilibrium in the case of lump sum taxation. Let further
β¯
(
ξ?m
)
=
1
1 − α
[
1
(ξ?m)1−α
− 1
]
,
where where ξ?m is given by (22). It should be noticed that if |I| < L/2, i.e.
βm < βmax, then β¯
(
ξ?m
)
does not depend on ξ?m:
β¯
(
ξ?m
)
=
1
1 − α
[
1
(1 − α)1−α − 1
]
.
Now we are ready to formulate our main result implying that there is a domain
of parameters where the equilibrium growth rate under flat-rate income taxation,
γ∗, is larger then that under lump sum taxation, γ?. This domain of parameters is
described by the following theorem.
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Theorem 3. γ∗ T γ? ⇔ β¯ (ξ?m) T βm.
Proof. The proof of the theorem is readily follows from the comparison of the
growth rates given by (14) and (24). 
In particular, this theorem says that if βm < β¯
(
ξ?m
)
, than flat-rate taxation
provides higher growth rate then lumps-sum taxation: γ∗ > γ?. The intuition
is simple. Impatient and poor individuals consider lump sum taxation as more
burdensome then flat-rate taxation providing the same growth rate, because in the
case of flat-rate taxation it is rich and patient individuals who carry a larger share
of the tax burden. If the median consumer is sufficiently impatient and poor, in
the case of lump sum taxation she will vote in favor of a less generous program of
public spending, than in the case of flat rate taxation. Therefore, in a steady-state
voting equilibrium, underprovision of public services under lump sum taxation
can be more severe than under distorting flat-rate taxation.
It should be noted that this effect can not be observed in models with homoge-
nous consumers or representative household because in that cases βm = βmax and
ξ?m = 1, so that β¯
(
ξ?m
)
= 0 and βm < β¯
(
ξ?m
)
is impossible.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered a Barro-type endogenous growth model. The
key feature of our model is that individuals differ in their discount factors allow-
ing them to compare utility from present and future consumption. The aggregate
production function is taken to be linearly homogeneous in capital and produc-
tive government services taken together, and this can lead to endogenous growth
driven by expansion of the capital stock and government services. The provision
of government services is financed by a flat-rate (linear) income tax or, in another
variant of the model, by a lump sum tax.
Taxation decreases the individuals consumption and savings at present but
leads to growth in government services, output, wages and interest rate in the fu-
ture. So, each individual has her own idea on the preferable tax rate determined
by her intertemporal preferences. Larger discount factor means that future con-
sumption is more valuable for an individual leading to larger preferable tax rate.
To associate economic policy and individual preferences we have introduced
a notion of voting equilibrium leading to some form of the median voter theorem,
according to which the tax rate selected by the government is the one preferred
by the median voter. We have fully characterized the structure of steady-state
equilibria in the two versions of our model and have derived explicit formulas for
the long-run rate of growth.
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These formulas say that, irrespective of the tax system, the larger is the dis-
count factor of the median voter, the larger is the tax rate determined by the voting
procedure, and consequently the higher is the rate of growth. They also show that
in the case of lump sum taxation the rate of growth is increasing in the relative
wealth of the median voter and that in the both cases it is increasing in the discount
factor of the most patient of consumer.
Finally, it follows from the derived formulas that under some condition dis-
torting flat-rate income taxation can lead to higher growth rate then undistorting
lump sum taxation.
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